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1 I don’t believe the viewpoints
of current and former central
bankers are very different.
 









he title of Stephen G. Cecchetti’s
article is “Measuring Short-Run Inﬂa-
tion for Central Bankers,” and that is
exactly the viewpoint from which I will
discuss it—the viewpoint of a 
 
former cen-
tral banker.1 I agreed to discuss this
article because of my three-plus years of
experience in month-to-month inﬂation
tracking as a central banker and, before
that, as a member of the Council of
Economic Advisers.  The name of the
game then was distinguishing the signal
from the noise, which was often difﬁcult.
The key question on my mind was
typically:  What part of each monthly
observation on inﬂation is durable and
what part is ﬂeeting?
Actually, what I meant by the term
durable differs subtly from Cecchetti’s
meaning.  To me, the durable part of the
information in each monthly inﬂation
report was the part that was useful in
medium- and near-term inﬂation fore-
casting.  This focus is slightly different
from Cecchetti’s; however, the two are
related.  The difference will assume some
importance at the end of my remarks.  
But ﬁrst I want to heap some praise on
Cecchetti’s article.
A little story explains why I agreed so
readily to discuss this article.  One day in
1995, I was having the chat I usually had
with Fed staffers on the day the producer
price index (PPI) or consumer price index
(CPI) release came out.  We did this exer-
cise twice a month, generally focusing on
the question:  What’s news and what’s
noise in this report? Suddenly, a thought
occurred to me—the kind of idea that
sometimes pops into your head and turns
out to be on the right track, but not quite
correct, once you have an opportunity to
think about it more deeply.  Why are we
always taking the food and energy compo-
nents out, I asked rhetorically? Because
we believe they are extremely volatile.
But we never actually test that hypothesis
statistically, nor do we apply it to the
other components.  Instead of giving food
and energy prices a weight of zero, and all
other components a weight of one,
shouldn’t we really to be weighting every
component inversely to its variance, or
doing something similar? Incidentally, I
believe my concrete suggestion to weight
inversely by variances was mistaken—for
reasons I will explain shortly.  But ﬁrst let
me ﬁnish the story.
So I suggested to the staff members
around the table that we should perhaps
reweight the price indexes in this way
instead of looking at “core” inﬂation.  Then
one of them—I can’t recall who—said, “You
know, there’s a paper by Steve Cecchetti that
claims we really ought to be looking at the
weighted median.”  I replied that I would
like to see that paper.  So what happened
next?  I never got the paper, and I never
saw the reweighted CPI.  (This was no sur-
prise, by the way.)  So, until Cecchetti’s
article arrived in the mail the other day, I
never saw another thing on this subject.  I
was extremely grateful when it arrived.
Cecchetti should be applauded for
writing this article.  It’s just the sort of work
I wish academics would do more often.
Unfortunately, although research like this is
extremely useful to policymakers, it is a
little too nitty-gritty for the tastes of most
academic researchers—which is a shame.
Cecchetti deals with two very concrete
issues—noise and bias.  To me, the two are
quite different conceptually.  In fact, one of
my minor quibbles with him is that he tries
to merge the two in ways that are perhaps
not so natural.  However, Cecchetti does
make a good point when he observes that
the bias can be, and indeed seems to be,
time varying.  If the bias is bouncing
around over time, it will look a lot like
noise.
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2 Incidentally, those of us who
are old enough to remember
the invention of the core con-
cept, and I’m one, may recall
that we ﬁrst started computing
the CPI with food, energy, 
 
and
used car prices omitted. This
last adjustment has since disap-
peared, and I don’t know why.
I think we should bring it back
for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing the fact that the price of a
used car is an asset price.
3 You can, however, say, “No
comment,” as I frequently did.
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THE BIAS ISSUE
I will concentrate on the noise issue—
just as Cecchetti does.  But ﬁrst a few
words on bias, once again from the view-
point of a central banker.
The question of bias in the CPI—or
indeed in any price index—has been intel-
lectually fascinating for a very long time
and continues to be so.  But from the
point of view of a central banker, this
intellectually engaging question is not of
great practical importance when inﬂation
is considerably above its long-run target.
Why not? Because, when you know you
want to reduce inﬂation substantially, it is
not terribly important to know whether
the price index overstates inﬂation by, say,
0.5 percent or 1.5 percent.  In either case,
the policy is more or less the same:  Bring
inﬂation down.  But as measured inﬂation
approaches the upper limit of credible
estimates of the bias in the inﬂation index,
the magnitude of that bias becomes a cru-
cial, if not the crucial, question of
monetary policy.  This was clearly not the
case in the 1970s.  However, it is the case
now.
It is important to realize that the cost
of making a mistake on this matter is
enormous.  If you do a standard
calculation using a Phillips curve and
Okun’s Law, it will tell you that it would
cost the country about $300 billion in lost
gross domestic product if the Federal
Reserve were to push inﬂation down one
percentage point “too much.”  Now that’s
a tidy sum, which will cover the salaries of
Federal Reserve staff for a very, very long
time—and the salaries of governors for
even longer.
Therein lies my quibble with Cecchet-
ti’s analysis.  Rather than treat the bias as a
purely statistical problem as he does
(where the bias is deﬁned more or less as
the deviation from a 36-month moving
average), I would favor a two-step app-
roach.  First, do what you can to reduce
the bias by ﬁxing up the index—including
the weighting, aspects of the measurement
of speciﬁc prices, and a whole variety of
other difﬁcult problems.  Then use the
dynamic factor index (DFI) that Cecchetti
recommends to extract the signal from the
noise.  To me, jumping right to the DFI is
putting the horse before the cart—and in
an overly mechanical way at that.
THE NOISE ISSUE
Let me now turn to the noise issue,
because this was my principal concern as
Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve.  I
think it is a principal concern of central
bankers everywhere.
As Cecchetti observes, two standard
approaches exist to coping with the prob-
lem of noise in monthly data.  One is to
use the so-called core CPI.2 The second is
time averaging over, say, 3, 6, or 12
months.  The ﬁrst approach tends to be
the American way:  We concentrate on
core inﬂation.  The second approach tends
to be the European way:  When the inﬂa-
tion rate is announced in, say, Germany or
Italy, it is almost always the 12-month
trailing moving average.
Cecchetti offers us four fascinating
ﬁndings.  First, eliminating food and
energy prices from the index is actually
worse than doing nothing! This was
astonishing to me, because I’ve been drop-
ping food and energy prices since the
1970s.  It set me thinking about the
criteria on which this judgment is based.
I will return to this point at the very end
of my remarks, for it is, in a sense, my
biggest objection to Cecchetti’s analysis.
Second, he ﬁnds that averaging over
three months is vastly superior to using
monthly numbers.  This ﬁnding really
warmed the cockles of my heart because,
when I was in government, journalists
were constantly asking me about, say, the
meaning of the August PPI report.  If you
are a professor sitting in your university
ofﬁce, you can give a curt answer to such
a question:  It has no meaning.  But if you
are a member of the Council of Economic
Advisers or a Governor of the Federal
Reserve, you can’t get away with that.3 So I
used to cite “Blinder’s Law of Weighting,”
which says that two consecutive monthly
observations are worth four times as much
as one, and three consecutive months areFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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4 A prominent exception is the
Bank of England, which
includes one or more such indi-
cators in its regular inﬂation
reports.
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worth eight times as much as one.  It’s a
doubling rule; however, I never carried it
beyond 23 = 8.  My view, in brief, is that it
takes at least three consecutive monthly
numbers before you have any meaningful
information.  So I was delighted to see
Cecchetti present this particular result.
I am sure it is correct!
His third interesting ﬁnding is that
some limited inﬂuence estimator (like the
10 percent trimmed mean) works best by
most criteria.  Of course, such comp-
licated inﬂation measures are not in
common use at central banks, to say the
least.4 But such measures are easy to com-
pute.  So perhaps central bankers should
take notice.
And ﬁnally, Cecchetti ﬁnds that at
least a full percentage point movement in
the underlying inﬂation rate—which he
represents by the 36-month moving
average—is required before you can
declare with any conﬁdence at all (even
25 percent conﬁdence, which is not
much) that inﬂation has changed.  This is
truly bad news for the Federal Open
Market Committee and, to the extent
these results can be generalized to other
countries, for central banks everywhere.
For I can tell you from personal experience
that a full percentage point change in the
inﬂation rate is a very big deal to central
bankers in low-inﬂation countries.  In fact,
central bankers in these circles sweat blood
over whether the underlying inﬂation rate
may have risen by a quarter percentage
point! That’s considered really important.




Here I would like to offer two sugges-
tions that are closely related.  One
pertains to the criterion—using the 36-
month centered moving average.  The
other has to do with how the various com-
ponents should be weighted.
Regarding the criterion, notice that a
36-month centered moving average treats
the past and the future symmetrically.
That is natural from the viewpoint of a
scholar analyzing historical data.  But it is
very unnatural from the viewpoint of a
central banker living in real time.  Histori-
cally, t – 1 and t + 1 look more or less the
same. But if you must make a decision at
time t, there is a world of difference bet-
ween t – 1 and t + 1.  The past is known;
the future is not.  More important, the
past is the dead hand of history, but the
central bank must worry about the future.
That is why I said earlier that I regarded
information as “durable” if it had value for
near- and medium-term forecasting.
Thinking about the distinction
between the past and the future gave me
an idea.  Why not assign different weights
to each component, but not in the way I
originally suggested that day at the Fed?
In retrospect, that idea seems wrong.
Why not weight each component, instead,
by its usefulness in forecasting future—not
past—inﬂation? By studying deviations
from a 36-month centered moving
average, Cecchetti’s analysis treats the
next 18 months and the past 18 months
symmetrically.  I am suggesting, instead,
that the next 18 months matter a good
deal more to central bankers than the past
18 months.
That brings me to my second sugges-
tion—the weighting.  The trimmed mean
assigns a zero weight to the largest and
smallest component-speciﬁc inﬂation
rates, and a unit weight to everything else.
In computing it, you pay no attention to
the name of each component.  But I want
to suggest that we should perhaps pay
attention to the component’s name.  Why?
Because I imagine that some components
have more ability to forecast future
“underlying” inﬂation than others.
Clearly, the weighting scheme I am now
suggesting is not the same as inverse vari-
ances.  Instead, it probably takes into
account (a) the persistence of each
component and (b) its covariance with
overall inﬂation.  From the point of view
of a central banker looking to the future, I
think it probably makes sense to reweight
all the components of the CPI in this
way—which is clearly quite different from,FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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say, computing the 10 percent trimmed
mean.
A PRACTICAL ILLUSTRATION
Let me wrap up by illustrating where
this alternative point of view might lead—
and how it differs from Cecchetti’s.  At the
beginning of his article, Cecchetti refers to
supply shocks and exchange-rate changes
as “sources of noise.” That phrase prac-
tically jumped right off the page at me, for
it was not at all the way I used to think
about these shocks.  At the Fed, I can
assure you, we never thought of the
exchange rate as a source of “noise.”  Far
from being statistical marginalia, we
thought of both supply shocks and
exchange-rate move-ments as raising
important policy issues.  Consider supply
shocks.
Suppose ﬁrst that food and energy
prices, whether or not they are “volatile,”
are included in the central bank’s target
inﬂation rate—the concept of inﬂation it
really cares about.  This is Cecchetti’s tacit
assumption, for he is always looking at
deviations from the smoothed path of 
CPI-U.  Then, if food and energy prices are
persistent, we surely would not want to
take them out of the index.  We clearly
would want to leave them in.  This may
account for the poor results Cecchetti gets
when he knocks food and energy prices
out of the index.
Now suppose, instead, that food and
energy prices are not part of the price
index the central bank is targeting.  It
cares instead about, say, “core” inﬂation.
Even then, however, the central bank
might still want to include food and energy
prices in the index it monitors on a
monthly basis.  It all depends on whether
recent values of food and energy inﬂation
help forecast future core inﬂation.
The latter comes closer to my own
views as a practicing central banker.
Indeed, while at the Fed, I was even known
to use the price of gold in forecasting inﬂa-
tion.  That shows the depths to which you
can sink if you immerse yourself too deeply
in the real world!
As a central banker, I always preferred
to view the inﬂation rate with its food and
energy components removed as our basic
goal.  But not because these components
are extremely volatile.  (I must admit,
however, I thought they were until Cecc-
hetti’s article arrived.)  The real reason was
that the prices of food (really, food at
home) and energy are, for the most part,
beyond the control of the central bank.
The Fed cannot do much about food and
energy prices—except, of course, to cause
a recession deep enough to ensure that
increases in these prices do not lead to
overall inﬂation.  But the central bank can
do something about the rest of the price
index—the part that comes out of the
industrial core of the economy, so to speak.
So I believe there is a good reason why
so many of the countries that now post
ofﬁcial inﬂation targets exclude food and
energy prices from their target inﬂation
rates: These prices do not logically belong
on their report cards.